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PUBLIC INTEREST LABOR DISPUTES IN CANADA:
A LEGISLATIVE PERSPECTIVE
H. W. ART mRs*
XPLORATION by Canadians and Americans of each other's labor relations
legislation should be profoundly reassuring to citizens of both countries. On
the one hand, Canadians will be relieved to find that one of the world's most
sophisticated industrial relations systems has yet to solve the riddle of the
public interest dispute. On the other hand, Americans can rest unembarrassed:
the elixir of industrial peace has not been discovered in the modest social
laboratory of their northern neighbor.
Both systems are premised on the practice of collective bargaining, so that
in both a strike is always a possibility. While we have been generally prepared
to accept strikes as the price we pay for the freedom of the parties to resolve
their differences privately, in an increasing variety of employment situations in
both countries, there is a growing feeling that this price is excessive. These
situations are generically described as "public interest" disputes or "emergency"
disputes. Neither description is a term of art, but both carry the same connota-
tion: some important interest of non-belligerents is being harmed or threatened
by a strike or lockout; this harm is of a different kind or quality from that
suffered by neutrals in any labor dispute; and for this reason the normal rules
of industrial conflict should be suspended or altered to permit governmental
action to restore peace.
Because governmental presence is the hallmark of the public interest
dispute, the legislative framework is particularly important. When and how, to
what extent, and with what effect, official action will displace private decision-
making: these are the unanswered, perhaps unanswerable, questions. Much of
the Canadian experience will seem familiar to American readers, naturally
enough in view of common industrial practices and similar basic labor laws.
Much, too, will be strange, a reflection of distinctive Canadian traditions, con-
stitutional doctrines, and socio-economic facts. Without fully canvassing the
dimensions of difference, however, a brief preliminary survey of the environment
of Canadian legislation must be undertaken.
I. THE ENVIRONMENT
A. The Constitution
Constitutional jurisdiction over labor relations in Canada rests primarily
with the provinces rather than the Federal government. Although in 1924 the
Ontario courts were prepared to view labor disputes as a matter of national
concern, attracting federal jurisdiction, the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council, then Canada's highest appellate tribunal, determined that relations
*Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto.
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between employers and employees were matters of a private nature and local
concern over which the provincial legislatures enjoyed primary jurisdiction. 1
Had the position of the provincial courts prevailed, Canada would have antici-
pated by about ten years the Jones & Laughlin Steel decision2 which is the con-
stitutional cornerstone of modern American labor legislation. Given the Privy
Council's holding, however, the problem of dealing with emergency and public
interest disputes has been immensely complicated.
To be sure, federal jurisdiction over interprovincial and international com-
munications and transportation, over defense and atomic energy, and over a few
anomalous industries owned or closely regulated by the federal government,
remains intact. This brings within the ambit of federal labor legislation such
key areas of employment relations as longshoring, airlines and railways, uranium
mines, and shipping.3 As well, the federal government obviously has power to
regulate legislatively its relationship with its own employees. Finally, in the event
of a true national emergency, such as war, federal power may constitutionally
be mobilized to regulate industrial relations in the national interest.4 One of the
unanswered questions of Canadian constitutional law is whether some less cata-
strophic event, such as a nation-wide strike in an important industry normally
falling within provincial jurisdiction, would equally attract federal jurisdiction.5
Implicit in this recital of federal power is the assumption that normally
provincial legislation will govern labor relations, and all provinces, as well as the
federal government, have in fact passed labor relations acts. In such important
industries as steel, coal, meat-packing, and automobile manufacturing, provincial
legislation prevails. Because of the 1925 Privy Council decision, Canadian courts
have been loath to embrace the view that the interprovincial or international
flow of goods to or from a plant, in and of itself, justifies national legislative
control.6 Critical areas of public or quasi-public employment such as hospitals,
municipalities, police forces and fire departments are likewise subject to pro-
vincial law. Indeed, it was the attempt to apply federal legislation to a municipal
1. Toronto Electric Comm'rs v. Snider, [19251 A.C. 396, [1925) 2 D.L.R. 5, [1925)
1 W.W.R. 785, rev'g 55 Ont. L.R. 454, [1924) 2 D.L.R. 761, [19241 1 D.L.R. 101.
2. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936).
3. See B. Laskin, Constitutional Law 434 (3d ed. 1966); Scott, Federal Jurisdiction
Over Labour Relations: A New Look, 6 McGill L.'. 153 (1959-60). The federal claim to
jurisdiction is found in the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, Can. Rev.
Stat. c. 152, § 53 (1952).
4. See Laskin, Recent Labour Legislation in Canada, 22 Can. B. Rev. 776 (1944).
See also Local 100, United Steel Workers of Am. v. Steel Co. of Can., Ltd., [1944] Ont.
299, 302-03, [1944) 2 D.L.R. 583, 586-88, [1944) Ont. W.N. 281, 283-84 (Lab. Ct.).
5. In Swait v. Trustees of Maritime Transp. Unions, [1967) Qu6. B.R. 315, 61
D.L.R.2d 317 (1966), the court upheld the constitutional validity of a federal statute
imposing government trusteeship on a number of unions representing maritime workers on
the great lakes. While the statute was designed to end a series of disruptive work stoppages
caused by inter-union rivalry, the majority of the court relied upon federal jurisdiction over
navigation and shipping. Only Brossard, J., was prepared to uphold the statute on the basis
that the disruption of shipping created "a state of emergency 'going beyond local or pro-
vincial concern or interests' which should 'from its inherent nature be the concern of the
Dominion as a whole' . . . " Id. at 325, 61 D.L.R.2d at 332.
6. See, e.g., Regina v. OLRB, ex rel. Dunn, [1963] 2 Ont. 301, 39 D.L.R.2d 346.
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electric system which may well have provoked the Privy Council into its deci-
sion.7 Given clear provincial responsibility for municipal institutions,8 a worse
test case for federal jurisdiction could hardly have been found.
In terms of the effective regulation of disputes in key industries, the absence
of federal power has not been catastrophic, if only because practical men appear
not to be unduly influenced by constitutional niceties. For example, a major
trucking strike in Ontario in the summer of 1966 disrupted both local and inter-
provincial transportation. Without attempting to draw lines of demarcation
between their respective jurisdictions, both federal and provincial governments
intervened co-operatively to provide conciliation services. Perhaps this collabora-
tion reflected a lesson learned from the much less happy attempt at federal-
provincial mediation of a nation-wide meat packing strike in 1947. An attempt
to co-ordinate peacekeeping efforts through a meeting of federal and provincial
representatives terminated in acrimonious debate, and officials of the various
governments went home "nursing their provincial autonomies." 9 In due course,
the strike was settled wnithout any official government action.
To the extent that constitutional jurisdiction has been responsible for
localized rather than nation-wide bargaining units, it might be thought to have
contributed to the avoidance of national emergencies. The shutdown of a pro-
ducer of one important industrial product will not have as serious an impact
upon the nation's economy if another producer in another province can to some
extent alleviate the shortage. However, as will be seen, this apparent constitu-
tional gratuity is of little practical significance.
B. Socio-economic Factors
The organization of the nation's economy, like its constitution, should in
theory exert a centrifugal influence on the formulation of policy. Ontario, at least
until recently, has been the home of the nation's steel industry and of all auto-
mobile manufacturing. Oil production is still largely localized in Alberta, and
coal mining has been primarily confined to that province and to Nova Scotia.
Thus, provincial rather than federal authorities have assumed the responsibility
for settling disputes in these important industries. Yet the theoretical handicap
of provincial decision-making is partially offset by the concentration of industry.
So long as the dispute is confined within a single jurisdiction, effective legislative
and administrative action remains possible. Ontario, for example, can and regu-
larly does keep the peace in the nation's steel industry.
The relatively small scale of heavy industry in Canada, and the availability
of imported goods, further diminishes the importance of disputes in these in-
dustries and their impact upon the national welfare. In this connection, Canada's
role as a middle power, modest military establishment, and her freedom from
7. Toronto Electric Comm'rs v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396, [1925) 2 D.L.R. 5, [1925)
1 W.W.R. 785, rev'g 55 Ont. L.R. 454, [1924] 2 D.L.R. 761.
8. British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 92(8).
9. See Scott, supra note 3, at 162.
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the heavier burdens of cold-war politics, have spared her the mixed blessings of
a significant "defense" industry, and of the attendant risks of labor disputes in
that industry.
These characteristics of Canadian industrial organization eliminate many
of the difficulties of defining national emergency and public interest disputes
which have plagued American writers.' 0 At least, little argument can be made
for the proposition that in Canada a prolonged labor dispute in the automobile,
aircraft or steel industries poses a threat to national security or to economic
stability. By the same token, the terms of contract settlements in those indus-
tries do not create the same repercussions throughout the economy as do com-
parable settlements in the United States. In peacetime, disruption of transporta-
tion stands almost alone as a national emergency or public interest situation.
At the provincial level, the "emergency" label is largely reserved for in-
dustries which touch public health and safety. This is not to say that the
definitional exercise can be avoided entirely. As will be seen, considerable energy
has been devoted to the identification of true emergencies, at the provincial
level, particularly where the local economy is based entirely upon a single in-
dustry.
Finally, public ownership of many crucial community services is much more
widespread in Canada than in the United States. For example, the federal gov-
ernment owns one of two major railway systems, one of two major airlines, and
one of two national communications networks. Most major ports are operated
under the direction of harbor commissioners appointed by the federal govern-
ment, and key ferry services connecting two island provinces to the mainland
are government-owned. Provincial and municipal governments, as well, own and
operate a broad range of public utilities, including electricity, and gas production
and distribution, local transit and ferry services, and, although its relevance to
this analysis is marginal, a monopoly on the retail sale of alcoholic beverages.
To the extent that government's participation in industrial relations as an
employer heightens the public interest in a labor dispute, a more interventionist
philosophy might be expected to prevail in Canada. As will be seen, however,
the trend is otherwise, and public ownership is not per se a badge of exceptional
public interest in a particular dispute. On the other hand, public ownership may
often create in Canada a monopoly or oligopoly situation where none exists in
the United States. A strike against a municipal transit commission which oper-
ates all forms of public transportation will create much greater dislocation in
the community than a strike against a privately-owned subway system which
leaves unaffected alternative modes of travel such as busses. Similarly, a nation-
wide strike on one of the two major railway systems would cripple Canada's
economy to a much greater extent than a strike in one of several competing
local lines in the United States. This is particularly true in respect of vast
10. See generally Emergency Disputes and National Policy (I. Bernstein, H. Enarson &
R. Fleming eds. 1955); Horlacher, A Political Science View of National Emergency Disputes,
333 Annals 85 (1961).
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mining and farming areas, served by one carrier whose operation is the only
means of bringing supplies into the community, and taking its single product
out. While some of these differences between Canada and the United States may
be diminished by the practice of multi-employer bargaining in the latter country,
the potential costs of a railway strike in Canada, given the scale and composition
of its economy, are relatively much greater. In political terms, this increased
risk creates pressures for government action which are often irresistible.
C. History
Down to the advent of collective bargaining legislation on the Wagner Act
model in the 1940's,". Canadian labor statutes had two distinctive charac-
teristics. First, there was a tendency to view the public interest dispute as the
typical dispute, and second (perhaps as a reflection of the first point) there was
an almost obsessive concern with peace-keeping.
The public interest dispute first attracted the attention of federal legisla-
tors in 1877, when an act was passed which effectively outlawed strikes on
railways and public utilities, by imposing criminal penalties oif employees
who interrupted service by breaching their contracts of employment. 12 This
Draconian approach soon gave way to a series of early peace-keeping experi-
ments. Several of these experiments, both provincial and federal, were attempts
to provide a general formula for the conciliation of all labor disputes.13 Virtually
all of these experiments were stillborn. 14 Of greater practical significance were
statutes providing for mediation, conciliation or arbitration of disputes affecting
coal mines,1 railways, and public utilities,16 at the provincial level, and ulti-
mately all three critical areas at the federal level. 17
11. Collective Bargaining Act, [1943] Ont. Stat. c. 4; Wartime Labour Relations
Regulations, P.C. 1003 (1944), passed pursuant to The War Measures Act, Can. Rev. Stat.
c. 206 (1927). For the evolution of collective bargaining legislation in Canada see A.
Carrothers, Collective Bargaining Law in Canada pt. I (1965).
12. Breaches of Contract Act, [1877] Can. Stat. c. 35, § 2, now located in Crim. Code,
[1953-542 Can. Stat. c. 51, § 365(1) (1954). Section 365(2) relieves from liability any
employee striking after exhaustion of all relevant requirements of applicable dispute settle-
ment legislation.
13. Trades Arbitration Act, [1873] Ont. Stat. c. 26; Trade Disputes Act, Ont. Rev.
Stat. c. 42 (1894); Labour Conciliation Act, [1893] B.C. Stat. c. 21; Labour Conciliation
and Arbitration Act, [1894) B.C. Stat. c. 23; Conciliation Act, [1900) Can. Stat. c. 24;
Trade Disputes Act, [1901] Que. Stat. c. 31.
14. See generally F. Anton, The Role of Government in the Settlement of Industrial
Disputes in Canada, chs. 4, 5 (1962).
15. Miners Arbitration Act, [1888] N.S. Stat. c. 3 (compulsory arbitration of wage
disputes in coal mines), replaced by Industrial Peace Act, [1925] N.S. Stat. c. 1 (non-binding
conciliation followed by binding arbitration, for labor disputes in mines and public
utilities).
16. Railway and Municipal Board Act, [1906) Ont. Stat. c. 31 §§ 58, 59 (voluntary
arbitration and non-binding mediation and fact-finding provided for labor disputes in public
utilities, railways, and street railways); Municipal Strikes and Lock-outs Act, [1921) Que.
Stat. c. 46 (compulsory non-binding arbitration provided for policemen, firemen, water-
works employees, and employees engaged in burning garbage).
17. Railway Labour Disputes Act, [1903) Can. Stat. c. 55 (non-binding conciliation,
arbitration); Conciliation and Labour Act, [1906) Can. Stat. c. 96 (general voluntary
conciliation; compulsory conciliation on railways); Industrial Disputes Investigation Act,
[1907) Can. Stat. c. 20 (compulsory conciliation, postponement of strikes, in labor disputes
43
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The earliest statutes required both parties to agree to the invocation of
conciliation procedures,' 8 but gradually this requirement was displaced by pro-
vision for conciliation either on the unilateral request of one party0 or as the
result of governmental initiative.20 While the burden of agreeing to conciliation
was shifted from the parties, it was replaced by a much heavier one: they were
obliged to refrain from open conflict until all peace-keeping procedures had run
their course.
21
The federal Industrial Disputes Investigation Act of 1907, embodying
these principles, covered workers employed "in any mining property, agency
of transportation or communication, or public service utility. '22 A constitu-
tional prophet might have foreseen that twenty years later the Privy Council
would confine its operation to employment which, for general regulatory pur-
poses, fell within the federal realm; but in terms of the development of policy
approaches, this was a secondary consideration. Although the provinces have
largely assumed the burden of lawmaking, and although collective bargaining
is now a primary characteristic of Canadian labor relations acts, the 1907 ap-
proach is still discernible today. Compulsory conciliation and the postponement
of strikes have become a regular feature of collective bargaining.23
Commentators have correctly observed 24 that dispute settlement techniques
appropriate to emergency disputes can have a detrimental effect when adapted
to the run-of-the-mill strike. The brighter side of this historical development,
however, is that a policy of public intervention to keep the peace in public
interest disputes is less anomalous in the Canadian context than in the United
States because of its longevity and accustomed prominence throughout the
whole industrial relations system.
Against this constitutional, socio-economic, and historical background, we
can now examine current patterns of legislative response to emergency disputes.
II. PATTERNS OF LEGISLATION
A. Government as an Employer
It has been a cliche of labor relations in the United States that collective
bargaining for government employees should be approached cautiously, if at
involving "any mining property, agency of transportation or communication, or public
service utility").
18. See, e.g., Conciliation Act, [1900] Can. Stat. c. 24, § 4(c).
19. Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, [1907] Can. Stat. c. 20, § 5.
20. Conciliation and Labour Act, [1900] Can. Stat. c. 96, §§ 6, 13.
21. Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, [1907] Can. Stat. c. 20, §§ 56, 57.
22. Id. § 2(c).
23. See, e.g., Industrial Relations & Disputes Investigation Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 152,
§ 21 (1952); Labour Relations Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 202, § 54 (1960); Labour Relations
Act, B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 205, § 45 (1960).
24. See, e.g., Canadian Policy Experiments with Public-Interest Disputes, 14 Lab, L.J.
739, 742 (1963); See also Patterns of Industrial Dispute Settlement in Five Canadian
Industries (H. Woods ed. 1958); Jamieson, Industrial Relations and Government Policy,
17 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sci. 25 (1951); Phillips, Government Conciliation in Labour Dis-
put es, 22 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sci. 523 (1956); Woods, Canadian Collective Bargaining and
Dispute Settlement Policy: An Appraisal, 21 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sci. 447 (1955).
44-
LABOR DISPUTES
all. Despite recent developments in the direction of fuller freedom to bargain
collectively at the federal level, and in a minority of the states,25 American
policymakers still appear to be dubious about the validity of a fullblown labor
relations system for public servants.26 Perhaps no obstacle to acceptance by gov-
ernment of private sector labor policies is greater than the haunting fear of a
strike. That government functions must continue uninterrupted by a work stop-
page is treated as a self-evident, if not a constitutional, truth.27 Canada, some-
what uncharacteristically, has overcome its historic respect for the supremacy
of Parliament and for the superiority of American industrial policies, with the
result that Canadian governmental labor relations statutes increasingly demon-
strate the disappearing dichotomy between the public and private sectors.
2 8
In this respect, the province of Saskatchewan was an early pioneer having
extended full rights to organize and strike to employees of the provincial gov-
ernment as early as 1944.29 While other jurisdictions are obviously moving in the
direction of normalizing their relationships with the collective bargaining repre-
sentatives of their employees, the recent federal Public Service Staff Relations
Act80 and the Quebec Labour Code,31 represent the greatest progress in this
direction. Without examining either of these statutes in detail, suffice it to say
that the former borrows from the private sector virtually all of the familiar
principles including the rights to organize, bargain collectively, and strike, and
sets them into a special administrative framework for federal civil servants. The
latter statute, in Quebec, simply brings public servants within the ambit of
general labor relations legislation. Finally, in virtually all provinces, munici-
palities and their emanations are now treated as ordinary employers, and are
subject to labor relations acts of general application.
The general trend in public employment, then, is to discard the constitu-
tional and political mythology of sovereign immunity. This new and realistic
approach, however, has its price. For the first time it has become necessary to
distinguish general governmental functions from those whose continued opera-
tion is essential to the health, safety and well-being of the community. Some
means had to be found for identifying these essential functions, and for giving
due weight to their special characteristics in the settlement of disputes.
The Quebec Labour Code, a general statute, contains special provisions
25. See Anderson, The U.S. Experience in Collective Bargaining in Public Employ-
ment, in Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: Theory and Practice (K. Warner ed.
1967).
26. See Heimbach, Pragan, Remus, Panel Discussion: Is Private Sector Industrial
Relations the Objective in the Federal Service?, in Collective Bargaining in the Public
Service, I.R.RA. Proceedings 1966 Annual Spring Meeting (H. Somers ed.).
27. See, e.g., Gregory, Introduction to Symposium on Labour Union Power and the
Public Interest, 35 Notre Dame Law. 592 (1960): "Surely we can all agree that government
employees cannot be allowed to strike." Id. at 593.
28. See Herman, Collective Bargaining by Civil Servants in Canada, supra note 26.
29. Trade Union Act, [1944] Sask. Stat. c. 69, § 2(6), consolidated in Sask. Rev. Stat.
c. 287, § 1(f) (1965).
30. [1966-67) Can. Stat. c. 71 (1966).
31. Que. Rev. Stat. c. 141 (1964), as amended, [19651 Que. Stat. c 50.
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relating to "employees of a public service."3 2 Included in this category are both
employees of the provincial government, and employees of a variety of munici-
pal, charitable and educational institutions, public utilities, and other govern-
mental and quasi-governmental bodies.3 3 For such employees, the right to strike
is maintained except to the extent that "a threatened or actual strike in a public
service endangers the public health or safety .. . or interferes with the educa-
tion of a group of students," 34 in which case the strike may be postponed. The
Quebec Civil Service Act,35 complementing the Labour Code, places upon unions
representing employees of the provincial government the obligation to make ar-
rangements for the maintenance of "essential services," as a condition precedent
to the right to strike. Power is also vested in a court to enjoin a strike of public
service employees, pending investigation by a fact-finding tribunal which has
no power to make recommendations.3 6
The brief experience since Quebec public service employees acquired the
right to strike in January, 1966, 3 7 has been traumatic. A prolonged strike of
teachers was ended only by special legislation," and a rotating strike by em-
ployees of the provincially-owned hydro-electric system lasted for some weeks
before the threat of legislation forced a settlement. Perhaps most dramatic have
been the strikes of hospital employees and nurses in defiance of an injunction
postponing strike action until adequate arrangements had been made for the
preservation of emergency services. However, this militancy in Quebec may be
attributable to the convergence of three unique influences: the revocation of
a statutes9 which for over twenty years had inhibited the bargaining activities
of the public employees, the outpouring of resentment after decades of frustra-
tion, and the spirit of Quebec's "quiet revolution," transposed from the political
to the economic sphere.
To what extent the right to strike in public employment will survive its
actual exercise is a matter of conjecture. Even though the Hydro Quebec strike
alone involved provincial government employees, even though the province sur-
vived the unthinkable-strikes in hospitals, schools, and public utilities-the
political pressure for anti-strike legislation will likely be too strong to ignore.
Part of the weakness of the Quebec statute is that controversies over the
essentiality of the struck service are conducted while the strike is in progress.
Accusations of reckless disregard for the public can therefore be made by the
government, while its attempts to forestall real or imagined emergencies through
injunctive action are politically risky because they smack of retroactivity. The
32. Id. § 99.
33. Id. § 1(n). See also Civil Service Act, [1965] Que. Stat. c. 14, §§ 68-75.
34. Lab. Code, Que. Rev. Stat, c. 141, § 99 (1964).
35. [1965] Que. Stat. c. 14, § 75.
36. Lab. Code, Que. Rev. Stat. c. 141, § 99 (1964).
37. The Civil Service Act, [1965] Que. Stat. c. 14, § 75 suspended the right to strike
until January 31, 1966.
38. An Act to Insure for Children the Right to Education and to Institute a New
Schooling Collective Agreement Plan, [1967] Que. Stat. bill 25.
39. Public Service Employees Disputes Act, Que. Rev. Stat. c. 169 (1941).
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federal Public Service Staff Relations Act provides a sounder method of pre-
venting emergencies while preserving the general right to strike. Upon obtaining
bargaining rights for federal public servants, a union is entitled to elect whether
it wishes to have future collective bargaining disputes settled by arbitration or
by a process of conciliation and, impliedly, by a strike.40 In the event that the
union selects the former alternative, no problems of emergency strikes can ob-
viously arise. However, in those bargaining units where a union chooses the
strike option, the Public Service Staff Relations Board, an impartial administra-
tive tribunal, must designate prior to conciliation, those employees or classes of
employees "whose duties consist in whole or in part of duties the performance
of which ... is or will be necessary in the interest of the safety or security of
the public." 41 No employee who is so designated is permitted to strike.
42
A third reaction to strikes by government employees in critical jobs is
that of Saskatchewan which, until 1966, had eschewed any legislation to main-
tain even essential services. However, in that year a strike by employees of the
Saskatchewan Power Corporation, the publicly-owned electrical distribution
system, was terminated by the passage of the Essential Services Emergency
Act.43 While framed in terms of general and future application, the statute
was passed at a special legislative session called for the purpose, and was in-
voked immediately. It required employees to terminate the strike and report
for work, and reinforced this obligation by a threat to revoke the union's bar-
gaining rights if it continued the strike, or failed, in the government's opinion,
"to do everything reasonably possible to end the strike. '44 Moreover, while the
statute submitted the dispute to arbitration, the validity of the arbitral award
was made conditional upon the termination of the strike. With the passage of
this statute, Saskatchewan joined the ranks of those provinces which make
special legislative provision for the maintenance of essential services. The
Saskatchewan statute, however, does not treat public servants differently from
persons in private employment in respect to the obligations imposed. All persons
involved in a strike in public utilities or hospitals which creates "a state of
emergency" are covered by the statute.
The conclusion that appears from the Quebec, federal, and Saskatchewan
statutes is that public employment in Canada does not necessarily transform
all strikes into emergencies or situations of particular public interest. Rather,
the test is the effect of the strike upon essential interests of the community.
While in Saskatchewan the cabinet45 is made the judge of actual or threatened
harm to public health or safety, under both the federal and Quebec statutes,
this task of adjudication is committed to an impartial body: in the former case
40. Public Service Staff Relations Act, [1967] Can. Stat. c. 71 §§ 36, 59.
41. Id. § 79.
42. Id. § 101(1)(c).
43. [1966-67] Sask. Stat. c. 2 (1966).
44. Id. § 10(1) (a).
45. Id. § 3.
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the Public Service Staff Relations Board46 and in the latter the Labour Relations
Board.
47
B. Defining and Confining the Concept of a Public Interest Dispute
If "public interest" disputes are not to be equated with disputes in "public
employment," what are their true dimensions? Theoretically, it should be pos-
sible to create a scale for measuring the degree to which the public interest is
present is a given dispute.48 However, the public interest cannot be measured
in purely quantitative terms. On the one hand, disputes in large corporations
may involve the participants, their customers and suppliers, in heavy economic
costs, yet these disputes may be qualitatively indistinguishable from disputes
in any ordinary small firm. Unless sheer size makes a private dispute public,
non-monetary factors must also be considered. On the other hand, while life,
health and physical safety are obviously matters of public concern, the mere
incantation of such phrases does not conjure up an accurate assessment of
whether a particular dispute should be treated in a special way because of its
"public" characteristics. For example, a railway strike causes losses which are
primarily economic, but for some isolated communities there may be the more
serious perils of food shortages or the unavailability of medical services formerly
procured from a neighboring town. Should its predominate economic character
or its incidental effect on human life determine the way in which the dispute
should be handled? Again, a strike of hospital employees may create a risk of
harm to patients, but this risk can be minimized if emergency services are
provided or if alternate hospital facilities are available nearby. How much of a
risk is the community prepared to accept?
Thus, the possibility of identifying public interest disputes by reference
to a theoretical model is something less than fruitful. At least for the purpose
of assessing the Canadian experience to date, it is actual events rather than
abstractions which must be relied upon to identify areas of labor relations
which are particularly affected by the public interest. Special legislative or
executive action, beyond the normal conciliation function, is at least prima facie
evidence that a dispute, or class of disputes, has unusual importance to the
public requiring unusual measures to avoid or terminate the disruption of
service.
Several caveats must at once be lodged against this method of defining
public interest disputes. First, it cannot be assumed that legislators and ad-
ministrators are infallible in their estimation of the impact of a strike upon the
public. To cite but two examples: During the 1950 steel strike in the United
States, President Truman justified his seizure of the steel companies on the
ground that interruption of steel production would imperil the nation's prosecu-
46. Public Service Staff Relations Act, [1967] Can. Stat. c. 71, § 79.
47. Civil Service Act, [1965] Que. Stat. c. 14, § 75.
48. See, e.g., N. Chamberlain & J. Schilling, The Impact of Strikes: Their Social and
Economic Costs (1954).
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tion of the Korean War; the seizure was declared unconstitutional; the strike
lasted fifty-five days; the war effort was virtually unaffected.49 In Quebec, in
1965, a strike of fourteen captains and mates led to the interruption of a local
ferry service between Quebec City and Levis, a small community across the
St. Lawrence river. Although the ferry operated in the shadow of a large modern
bridge, the situation was deemed an emergency, and a special statute was passed
authorizing the government to seize the operation and to re-establish service. 50
At opposite extremes of the spectrum, these two situations illustrate the real
dangers of relying upon the judgments of legislators or administrators as to
when the public interest is imperiled. Second, even allowing for bona fide errors
of judgment, political pressures may preclude intervention when it is needed
or provoke it when it is not. Third, government officials so regularly intervene
to assist the parties in reaching a settlement that the legal limits of the com-
pulsory conciliation procedure are no longer its de facto limits. In hundreds of
disputes, the Department of Labour will use its good offices to end strikes even
though the parties have exhausted the formal dispute settlement procedures.
Yet if each such case of "special" concern were taken to be a public interest
dispute, the term would lose its meaning. It is only formal legislation or execu-
tive intervention of a particularly forceful type that can be regarded as sympto-
matic of a special public interest.
Keeping in mind these serious definitional problems, when has a special
public interest been perceived to exist in Canadian labor disputes?
There is almost uniform tendency to treat policemen 51 and firemen 52 in a
special way, and a plurality of the provinces make a special arrangements to
prevent interruption of public utility services.53 Increasingly in recent years
labor disputes in hospitals have been the subject of special legislation,54 as have
49. See H. Northrup, Compulsory Arbitration and Government Intervention in Labour
Disputes 126 (1966).
50. Transportation Board Act, Que. Rev. Stat. c. 228 (1964), as amended, [1965]
Que. Stat. bill 1.
51. The Police Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 236, §§ 24-30 (1955), as amended, [1956)
Alta. Stat. c. 41; Municipal Act, B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 255, § 194 (1960); Labour Relations Act,
Man. Rev. Stat. c. 132, § 21(2) (1954); The Police Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 298, §§ 26-35
(1960); Industrial Relations Act, [1962] P.E.I. Stat. c. 18, § 44; Lab. Code, Que. Rev.
Stat. c. 141, §§ 82, 93, 142 (1964) ; City Act, Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 147, § 104 (1965).
52. Fire Departments Platoon Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 114, § 14 (1955); Municipal Act,
B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 255, § 194 (1960) ; Fire Departments Arbitration Act, [1954) Man. Stat.
c. 8, §§ 6, 8; Fire Departments Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 145, §§ 6, 7 (1960); Industrial
Relations Act, [1962] P.E.I. Stat. c. 18, § 44; Lab. Code, Que. Rev. Stat. c. 141, §§ 82, 93
(1964) ; Fire Departments Platoon Act, Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 173, § 10 (1965).
53. B.C. Hydro & Power Authority Act, [1964) B.C. Stat. c. 7; The Alberta Labour
Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 167, § 99 (1955), as amended, [1960) Alta. Stat. c. 54; LabQur
Relations Act, Man. Rev. Stat. c. 132, § 78 (1954), as amended, [1958] Man. Stat. c. 29;
Industrial Relations Act, [1962) P.E.I. Stat. c. 18, § 42; Essential Services Emergency Act,
[1966-67) Sask. Stat. c. 2 (1966) ; Trade Union Act, N.S. Rev. Stat. c. 295, § 68(2) (1954),
as amended, [1965) N.S. Stat. c. 53; Toronto Hydro-Employees' Union Dispute Act, [1965]
Ont. Stat. c. 131, §§ 3, 4, 6; Ontario Hydro-Employees' Union Dispute Act, [1961-62] Ont.
Stat. c. 94, §§ 2, 3, 5 (1962).
54. Hospital Employees (Employment) Act, [1966-67) Newf. Stat. c. 11 (1966);
Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act, [1965] Ont. Stat. c. 48; The Alberta Labour
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strikes involving railways, 55 shipping 6 and ferry services. Rounding out the
list of "public interest" situations, at least as evidenced by legislative interven-
tion, are teachers58 and government employees 9 (in some provinces) and-
perhaps reflecting local economic and social idiosyncracies: loggers 0 and liquor
store employees.61
The list is short, and it does not cut to the core of the labor force. Except
for the loggers, whose violent strike was alleged to have jeopardized the basic
economy of the province of Newfoundland, all of these groups of employees
were involved in industries which were publicly-owned or subsidized, or which
enjoyed a publicly-granted monopoly. Moreover, with the added possible ex-
ception of liquor stores, the services provided actually were related to the
physical health and safety of the community, or to the maintenance of com-
munications. Arguably, the flow of persons and goods by rail should not be
distinguished from their transportation by air, water or truck, but perhaps the
special facts of Canada's geography and economy warrant the special concern
which has been shown for railway labor disputes.6 2 Of this, more below.
Apart from formal legislative recognition of a "public interest" factor in
certain disputes, there have been a number of recent cases in which dramatic
executive action, similarly motivated, has forestalled or ended a strike. Several
of these cases involved industries already mentioned-railways,
3 hospitals, 4
Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 167, § 99 (1955), as amended, [1960] Alta. Stat. c. 54; Essential
Services Emergency Act, [1966-67] Sask. Stat. c. 2, §§ 4, 7 (1966).
55. Maintenance of Railway Operation Act, [19661 Can. Stat. bill C-230; Railway
Operation Continuation Act, [1960-61] Can. Stat. c. 2 (1960).
56. St. Lawrence Ports Working Conditions Act, [1966-67] Can. Stat. bill C-215
(1966); Maritime Transportation Unions Trustees Act, [1963] Can. Stat. c. 17.
57. British Columbia Coast Steamship Service Act, [1958] Can. Stat. c. 7; Trans-
portation Board Act, Que. Rev. Stat. c. 228 (1964), as amended, [1965) Que. Stat. bill 1.
58. Public Schools Act, B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 319, § 140 (1960) as amended, [1965] B.C.
Stat. c. 41; Public Schools Act, Man. Rev. Stat. c. 215, § 379(b) (1954), as amended,
[1956] Man. Stat. c. 53; An Act to Insure to Children the Right to Education and to
Institute a New Schooling Collective Agreement Plan, [1967] Que. Stat. bill 25.
59. Public Service Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 263, §§ 56-60 (1955), as amended
[19653 Alta. Stat. c. 75; Constitution Act, [1959] B.C. Stat. c. 17; Public Service Staff
Relations Act, [1967] Can. Stat. c. 72; Civil Service Act, Man. Rev. Stat. c. 39,
§ 45(I) (1954), as amended, [1965] Man. Stat. c. 11; Civil Service Act, N.B. Rev.
Stat. c. 29, § 52 (1952), as amended, [1964] N.B. Stat. c. 17; Public Service Act, Ont.
Rev. Stat. c. 331, § 19 (1960), as amended, [1962-63] Ont. Stat. c. 118 (1963), and
[1966] Ont. Stat. c. 130; Civil Service Act, [1965] Que. Stat. c. 14.
60. Trade Union (Emergency Provisions) Act, [1959] Newf. Stat. c. 2; Labour Rela-
tions (Amendment) Act, [1959] Newf. Stat. c. 1.
61. Labour Relations Act, Man. Rev. Stat. c. 132, § 78 (1954), as amended, [1958]
Man. Stat. c. 29; Trade Union Act, N.S. Rev. Stat. c. 295, § 68(2) (1954), as amended,
[1965] N.S. Stat. c. 53.
62. To an extent, the rate structure of the two major lines, and the public ownership
of one of them, reflects a belief that the railway is an instrument of national policy, linking
east and west, and underpinning the prosperity of the key wheat-growing areas on the
prairies.
63. R. Kellock, Report of the Royal Commission on Employment of Firemen on
Diesel Locomotives (Can. 1957); S. Freedman, Report on Industrial Commission Relating
to C.N.R. Run-Throughs (Can. 1965).
64. C. E. Bennett, Report on Royal Commission on Compulsory Arbitration in Dis-
putes Affecting Hospitals and Their Employees (Ont. 1964).
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and shipping; 6 r but the list might be extended to include longshoremen,66 and
postal employees. 67 In each case, a royal commission, or less formal industrial
inquiry commission, was appointed to investigate the dispute, although not
necessarily empowered to settle it.
Beyond this point, documentation becomes difficult, and the line between
significant and merely routine intervention blurs. In a number of transportation
disputes; e.g., in airlines, long-distance trucking and local transit systems, active
and intensive mediation has been reinforced by veiled or blatant threats of
special legislation to end the strike. Major strikes in a Maritoba packinghouse
and in the west coast fishing industry led to the appointment, respectively, of
a royal commission68 and a federal-provincial committee of inquiry 69 as part
of a long-term exercise in peace-keeping. Violence and community disruption
probably account for the special concern of government in strikes of dump-truck
operators and construction workers in Toronto, both of which also gave birth
to well-known royal commissions. 70 Indeed, royal commissions and industrial
inquiries have been so frequently used as a means of "cooling-off" bitter strikes,
that their appointment is of diminishing significance as an accurate benchmark
of the public interest. Finally, if high-level official intervention in the bar-
gaining process is per se a sign of public interest in a dispute, there is hardly
an industry which has escaped the distinction of community concern: news-
papers, hotels, television broadcasting, steel manufacturing and oil refining,
textile mills and furniture factories, racetracks and breweries; all of these,
and others, in recent years have been deemed worthy of ministerial interven-
tion.
The conclusion is inescapable: in the Canadian tradition, all disputes are
public interest disputes to a greater or lesser degree. The turn-of-the-century
policy of compulsory conciliation established this, and the contemporary passion
for informal intervention, fact-finding and legislative regulation serves to under-
line it. Thus, Canadian labor relations policy is ambivalent, if not schizophrenic.
65. On July 17, 1962, T.G. Norris, J., was appointed as the Industrial Inquiry Comm'n
on the Disruption of Shipping, following a thirty-hour disruption of shipping along the St.
Lawrence River on July 5 and 6. See infra note 105.
66. In August, 1966, Mr. LA. Picard was appointed as an Industrial Inquiry Comm'n
to investigate certain matters connected with the settlement of a dispute affecting long-
shoremen in the ports of Montreal, Trois-Rivi~res and Quebec. Under the provisions of the
St. Lawrence Ports Working Conditions Act, [1966-67] Can. Stat. bill C-215 (1966), his
recommendations were made binding on all parties.
67. 1.C. Anderson, J., was appointed as an Industrial Inquiry Comm'n to inquire into
salaries during the seventeen-day postal strike in 1965. Following a return to work by all
the strikers except those in Montreal, a nation-wide referendum among the postal workers
accepted judge Anderson's recommendations. In a subsequent vote, taken separately, the
Montreal workers also adopted the recommendations. 65 Lab. Gaz. 789 (1965).
68. G. E. Tritschler, Report of the Brandon Packers Strike Commission. (Man. 1961).
69. Federal-Provincial Committee Report on Wage and Price Disputes in the British
Columbia Fishing Industry (1964).
70. W. D. Roach, Royal Commission Inquiry into Certain Activities of the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters in Connection with Truckers Hauling Sand and Gravel in
the Toronto-Hamilton Area (Ont. 1958); H. C. Goldenberg, Royal Commission on Labour-
Management Relations in the Construction Industry (Ont. 1962).
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A laissez-faire philosophy, borrowed from the Wagner Act, assumes that col-
lective bargaining and sweet reason will conquer all. But when serious conflict
occasionally breaks out, the policy of allowing the parties to settle their dif-
ferences is petulantly repudiated, and government returns to its historic pursuit
of that holy grail-industrial peace.
This pattern has a dynamic of its own which further complicates the task
of defining public interest disputes. Each interventionist episode is used as a
precedent to justify further intervention: if railroaders labor in the public in-
terest, why not longshoremen and seamen and workers in wheat storage facili-
ties? If the production of electric power is essential to the community, why not
its distribution, or the production and distribution of natural gas or petroleum
products? If the uninterrupted flow of goods is a matter of public concern, why
not the uninterrupted flow of news and advertising on radio and television and
in the daily newspapers?
This amoeba-like tendency of public interest disputes to reproduce them-
selves is clearly evident in the railways. In the early 1900's, when railways were
the only effective means of communication linking the new Canadian west with
the eastern centers of commerce and government, a railway strike could literally
paralyze the country. In response to several such traumatic strikes, legislation
was passed in 190371 and 190672 which, as has been seen, introduced the con-
cepts of compulsory conciliation and the postponement of strikes. Wartime
emergencies apart, this relatively mild form of intervention prevailed until 1950,
throughout the years when highway transport developed to the point where it
could provide efficient regional service, and air lines began to carry a significant
proportion of passengFr traffic. Yet despite the decreasing importance of rail-
ways over this half-century, in 1950 a more active period of intervention began
with the passage of a federal statute7" ending a strike of nonoperating em-
ployees on the two major railways, and submitting the issues to compulsory ar-
bitration. In 1954, the same parties were confronted with the threat of similar
legislation, and they "agreed" to submit to arbitration instead of resorting
to economic conflict. In 1957, a strike of railway firemen occurred, the central
issue being their future employment on diesels. Once again, government in-
tervention terminated the strike: the merits of the work assignment issue were
submitted to a royal commission for investigation. 4 Between 1950 and 1960,
the relative importance of the railways to the national economy had declined
even further, because of the opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway, the further
expansion of trucking services, and the great increase in air transport, as well
as its extension to many formerly isolated areas. Nonetheless, in 1960 an im-
minent strike of nonoperating employees was forestalled by the simple expedient
71. Railway Labour Disputes Act, [19031 Can. Stat. c. 55.
72. Conciliation and Labour Act, [1906] Can. Stat. c. 96.
73. Maintenance of Railway Operations Act, [1950-51] Can. Stat. c. 1 (1950).
74. R. Kellock, supra note 63.
LABOR DISPUTES
of legislation which extended the duration of the expiring collective agreements,75
(under Canadian law, all strikes during the term of a collective agreement are
illegal).76 The parties were able to negotiate a settlement prior to the new strike
deadline thus established. In 1964, maintenance employees engaged in a wild-
cat strike were persuaded to return to work by the promise of the appointment
of a royal commission to investigate their protest against threatened layoffs.
77
Most recently, in 1966 a major strike of both nonoperating employees and run-
ning trades was ended after about one week by ad hoc legislation submitting
the issues to mediation and, ultimately, to arbitration.7
8
Thus, while railways disputes are, if anything, less crucial to the public
interest today than they were in the 1900's, the public is becoming more in-
tensely preoccupied with avoiding any disruption of service. Experience since
the strike-ending statute of 1950 shows that special executive or legislative
action is an almost certain substitute for economic action if collective bar-
gaining breaks down. Knowledge of this certainty has become part of the
tactical calculus of the parties, and they in turn help to make intervention more
certain by a refusal to settle until it occurs.
In summary, an initial decision that a particular industry affects the
public interest tends to be self-confirming. Intervention becomes a way of life:
the very fact of past intervention is presented as evidence that the public
interest is involved, and can only be protected by further intervention.
Certain institutional arrangements operate to inhibit this tendency, and
to create a buffer against the pressure of public opinion favoring intervention,
whether spontaneously generated or artfully manipulated by one of the dis-
puting parties. First, in practice the initiative exercised by the executive in the
Canadian parliamentary system is probably less than under the American
system, although by definition Canadian cabinets enjoy majority support in
the legislature. There is, therefore, a general reluctance on the part of the
government to utilize its inherent emergency powers to justify intervention in
a labor dispute-this has been done only twice in the postwar period79-or to
75. Railway Operation Continuation Act, [1960-61] Can. Stat. c. 2 (1960).
76. Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 152, § 22
(1952).
77. See Freedman, supra note 63.
78. Maintenance of Railway Operation Act, [1966] Can. Stat. bill C-230.
79, In 1958, the government of British Columbia invoked the Civil Defense Act, B.C.
Rev. Stat. c. 55 (1960), to prevent a strike on a coastal ferry serving a number of other-
wise isolated communities. Any challenge to the dubious legality of this action was fore-
stalled by the passage of federal legislation, the British Columbia Coast Steamship Service
Act, [1958] Can. Stat. c. 7, which ordered the employees to remain to work and appointed
an administrator to carry on the operation of the ferry service. In 1966, the Prince Edward
Island Emergency Measures Act, [1959] P.E.I. Stat. c. 4, as amended, [1966] P.E.I. Stat.
c. 3, was invoked in an attempt to end a strike of workers on a ferry connecting the
province with the mainland. The ferry was owned by the Canadian Nat'l Ry., and had
ceased operation as a result of the 1966 railway strike. The provincial intervention had the
effect of securing the withdrawal of pickets and of permitting a partial restoration of service.
Soon afterwards, the strike itself was terminated by the passage of a federal statute, the
Maintenance of Railway Operation Act, [1966] Can. Stat. bill C-230.
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accept an open-ended mandate to deal with labor disputes affecting the public
interest, without a careful specification of procedures and objectives.80 Also,
the legality of executive action not clearly sanctioned by statute is likely to be
challenged in the courts. To the extent, then, that forceful executive action is
dependent on an authorizing statute, the absence of such a statute is a deterrent
to impetuosity.
It follows that a second consideration which militates against too-frequent
and too-hasty intervention is the slowness of the legislative machinery. Unless
the union is obliging enough to strike while the legislature is sitting, it must be
summoned and its cumbersome rites observed. 81 If there is political capital to be
made from harassing the government, or from delaying the passage of legislation,
the opposition is presented with a golden opportunity. Equally, a government
reluctant to intervene can plead that its hands are tied by the absence of existing
legislation and the difficulties of passing new legislation. Finally, on this point,
a government which brings in legislation to settle a dispute which is already
under way is open to two charges, both of which may damage it politically:
critics of the government may condemn it for allowing the situation to degenerate
to the point where special measures are needed, and the parties to the dispute
can protest that "the rules have been changed in the middle of the game." All
of these factors must give pause to any government considering emergency
legislation to meet a particular crisis.
Paradoxically, the very existence of fixed and specific procedures for the
settlement of public interest disputes tends to operate in the same way as the
absence of such procedures, to insulate the government against demands for
improvised, ad hoc intervention. Where legislation has already been passed
which deals with disputes in a particular way, to the extent that it is effective,
it will alleviate the pressure for further intervention. As well, to superimpose
special procedures upon standing procedures in a particular case would appear
to be especially unfair.
Yet, as Canadian experience over the past twenty years has shown, the
trend has been towards intervention, and thus towards a broader operative
definition of the public interest dispute. The institutional constraints have proved
to be less powerful than the political pressures in favor of intervention. On the
assumption that the public interest dispute is a permanent, and probably grow-
80. But see Alberta Labour Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 167, § 99 (1955), as amended,
[1959] Alta. Stat. c. 54, § 32, which empowers the provincial cabinet, by proclamation, to
declare that a labor dispute in a public utility or hospital has created an emergency affecting
life or property. When such a proclamation has been made, strikes or lockouts become illegal,
and the Minister of Labour is empowered "to do all such things as may be necessary to
settle the dispute." Id. This provision has never been invoked.
81. E.g., in 1966 the federal government was prevented from introducing legislation
to end a strike of longshoremen in British Columbia by the refusal of a single member,
M. G. Gregoire, a self-styled Quebec separatist, to consent to a motion to suspend the rules
of the House of Commons, the unanimous consent of the House being required in such a
case.
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ing, feature of Canadian industrial relations, we must next turn to a closer anal-
ysis of the techniques by which these disputes have been settled.
C. Experiments in Peace-keeping
The general pattern of Canadian labor relations legislation, as has been
noted, is to superimpose upon the process of collective bargaining an obligation
to resort to conciliation. Until conciliation procedures have been exhausted, in
most jurisdictions, there can be neither strikes nor lockouts.8 2 This legislation
applies to public interest disputes as to all others except to the extent that
special statutes substitute a different arrangement. Indeed, the public interest
dispute was the archetypical situation in which Canadian legislation was designed
to operate. To this extent, then, public interest disputes are regularly the subject
of peace-keeping efforts. However, conciliation in public interest disputes does
have certain special characteristics.
In its pristine form,8 the conciliation process generally operated in two
stages. A conciliation officer, employed by the Department of Labour, would
meet with the parties and attempt to persuade them to settle their differences.
If he failed to secure a settlement, he would so advise the Minister of Labour
who was empowered to, and almost invariably did, establish a tripartite board
of conciliation. The board was armed with sweeping powers to compel the pro-
duction of documents and the giving of evidence,84 and tended to follow court-
like procedures. But its ostensible function was to secure compromise. If peace-
keeping efforts failed, the board would report to the Minister and recommend
appropriate terms of settlement.8 5 This report, implicitly or explicitly, would
identify the party whose unreasonableness, presumably, had frustrated agree-
ment. Public opinion could then be mobilized in favor of the board's proposals,
and pressure would mount for settlement on the terms recommended. The board
thus was designed to perform a normative function, in effect nonbinding adjudi-
cation, which was often inconsistent with its peace-keeping mission.
The inconsistency of these two roles is easily illustrated. An important tech-
nique of peace-keeping is to avoid confrontation; by keeping the parties apart,
and in ignorance of each other's position, a skilled conciliator may gradually per-
82. See statutes compiled in supra note 23. See also Alberta Labour Act, Alta. Rev.
Stat, c. 167, § 94 (1955), as amended, [1964-] Alta. Stat. c. 41; Labour Relations Act,
N.B. Rev. Stat. c. 124, § 20 (1952); Labour Relations Act, Newf. Rev. Stat. c. 258, § 22
(1952); Trade Union Act, N.S. Rev. Stat. c. 295, § 21 (1954), as amended, [1964] N.S.
Stat. c. 48; Industrial Relations Act, [1962] P.E.I. Stat. c. 18, § 38.
83. W. Cummingham, Compulsory Conciliation and Collective Bargaining, The New
Brunswick Experience (1958); Herbert, Conciliation Boards in British Columbia, 3 Curr.
Lav & Soc. Prob. 130 (1963); Kovacs, Compulsory Conciliation in Canada, 10 Lab. L.J.
100 (1959); Levinson, Compulsory Conciliation Machinery in Ontario, 1 Osgoode Hall L.J.
47 (1958); Taylor, Conciliation, in [1954] Spec. Lect. Law Soc. Upper Can. 113; see also
Phillips, Government Conciliation in Labour Dispute, 22 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sci. 523
(1956); Woods, Canadian Collective Bargaining and Dispute Settlement Policy: An Ap-
praisal, 21 Can. 3. Econ. & Pol. Sci. 447 (1955).
84. Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, [1907] Can. Stat. c. 20, § 30.
85. Id. §§ 25, 26.
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suade them to move towards a common ground. However, adversary-style pro-
ceedings have the effect of highlighting issues in dispute and of forcing the
parties to articulate clearly opposing viewpoints. Similarly, a good conciliator
who has not succeeded in bringing the parties together on all issues will wish to
avoid doing anything which might inhibit compromise at a later date. Contrari-
wise, a conciliation report designed to secure adherence to recommended norms
through the pressure of public opinion may freeze negotiating positions which
were actually fluid, or may bolster the determination of the favored party to
refuse further concessions, even though these might be useful and essential to a
negotiated settlement. Finally, the norm-setting conciliator is operating under
the twin handicaps that a particular set of contract terms is often rationally
indefensible, although conducive to settlement, and that the public understands
little and cares less about the controversy between the two parties to the dispute.
A report, therefore, often did little to produce pressures for settlement, and
sometimes actually served to exacerbate the situation.
In the 1950's and 1960's a subtle change has taken place in general
Canadian conciliation techniques. Much more emphasis has come to be placed
on the accommodative rather than the adjudicative functions of conciliators, 80
with the result that the use of the formal, tripartite board has declined. 81
With this decline came the eclipse of the board report as a technique of pres-
suring the parties to agree to a settlement. But, while this evolution generally
helped to increase the effectiveness of conciliation, the special setting of public
interest disputes tended to preserve old-style normative conciliation in this area
of conflict.
While it is generally conceded that the postponement of conflict is not
per se conducive to settlement, in public interest disputes no government wishes
to expose itself to the charge that it failed to do everything within its power to
keep the peace. Therefore, while conciliation is being used more selectively
throughout the economy, it is virtually automatic in public interest disputes;
too frequent use may undermine the efficacy of even the best-designed system.
Second, it has long been observed that when conciliation is automatic, direct
bargaining tends to become a mere rehearsal for it, especially since a norm-fixing
report is so often framed as a compromise between two apparently irreconciliable
positions. Similarly, since post-conciliation government intervention, whether by
informal mediation or formal arbitration, has become a regular feature of
86. Levinson, supra note 83, at 53. But see Herbert, supra note 83.
87. Quebec no longer provides for the appointment of boards of conciliation, although
it still requires the appointment of a conciliation officer on application of either party. Lab.
Code, Que. Rev. Stat. c. 141, § 43 (1964). Other provinces permit the parties to choose either
a one-step or a two-step conciliation procedure. See, e.g., Labour Relations Act, Ont. Rev.
Stat. c. 202, § 14 (1960), as amended, [1964] Ont. Stat. c. 53; Man. Rev. Stat. c. 132, §
16(4) (1954), as amended, [1962) Man. Stat. c. 35. In some provinces, the the Minister is
given considerable discretion as to the establishment of a conciliation board, and increas-
ingly is declining to appoint such boards. See, e.g., Labour Relations Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c.
202, § 16(b) (1960); Man. Rev. Stat. c. 132, § 17 (1954); Trade Union Act, Sask. Rev.
Stat. c. 287, § 21 (1965).
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Canadian public interest disputes, conciliation itself has tended to become a
prelude to such intervention, rather than a fruitful search for compromise. Third,
while the public is uninformed and unconcerned about the mill-run of disputes,
*a work stoppage in transportation, communications, or public utilities imme-
diately engages the attention and concern of the whole community. Even con-
ceding the limits within which the community can pressure either of the parties,
a conciliation report may come closer to serving its original function of mobilizing
public opinion in these situations than in the generality of cases. Finally, where
the industry or service affected is a private or public monopoly, any wage in-
crease is almost sure to generate pressures for price or rate increases, or for tax
subsidies. The public therefore has a more direct and easily identifiable interest
in the substantive terms of any bargain, and will naturally wish to measure the
position of the parties against the yardstick of a conciliation board report.
All qf these factors operating in the public interest dispute tend to maxi-
mize the formality of the conciliation board's proceedings and its report and
thus, if general experience is any criterion, to minimize its effectiveness in avoid-
ing strikes. Since conflict tends not to be resolved through the regular concilia-
tion procedures, there are obviously strong temptations to invoke special mea-
sures rather than accept the consequences of a work stoppage.
Informal mediation by senior government officials is the most common post-
conciliation step, and the one closest to the mainstream of collective bargaining.
At a minimum, the prestige of the mediator may be used to gain the confidence
of the parties, and to give new momentum to settlement discussions. Beyond
this, a recalcitrant union may be persuaded to sign an agreement by a promise
to investigate its just complaints,88 or an employer by the promise of a subsidy
or rate increase.8 9 If persuasion fails, threats may prevail-threats to impose a
solution by law,90 or to seize the enterprise.9 1 These mediation efforts, conducted
with varying degrees of subtlety and sophistication, undoubtedly produce many
settlements. However, as with conciliation itself, promiscuous peace-keeping ef-
forts at the highest level tend ultimately to be self-defeating. The prestige of a
cabinet-level mediator which should be a catalyst to negotiation is often diluted
by his pursuit of the political advantages of having "sold" a settlement; threats
and promises, if not fulfilled, tend thereafter to become less credible.
88. In 1956, a strike of railway firemen was avoided by the appointment of a royal
commission to investigate their future use on diesel trains. See R. Kellock, supra note 63.
In 1966, a longshoremen's strike was brought to a halt by the government's promise to
investigate complaints of bad working conditions; as part of the settlement, in effect,
the St. Lawrence Ports Working Conditions Act, [1966-67] Can. Stat. bill C-215 (1966),
was passed, establishing acceptable minimum guarantees for the men.
89. E.g., in 1956, the railways were permitted to increase freight rates to cover an
additional wage burden incurred as the result of concessions made under government pres-
sure.
90. This occurred during the railway negotiations of 1954, the Air Canada strike of
1966, and the Quebec Hydro strike of 1967.
91. Seizure occurred during the 1958 strike of coastal ferries in British Columbia, and
during a 1966 strike of Quebec hospital workers.
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Some few attempts have been made to institutionalize high-level mediation.
In Nova Scotia, for example, employees of the provincial power and liquor
commissions are permitted to strike, but their right to do so is postponed for
a thirty-day period following conciliation, 92 presumably to permit further media-
tion efforts. In Prince Edward Island, following conciliation, parties to a labor
dispute affecting a public utility must submit to a formal hearing by the Public
Utilities Commission; strikes are postponed until fifteen days after the issuance
of its non-binding report 3 Quebec legislation provides for postponement of
strikes which may endanger the public health or safety, for up to eighty days
pending fact-finding by an ad hoc board of inquiry.9
4
Special legislation has been passed on occasion to extend the term of an
expired collective agreement and thus to create a period within which negotia-
tion, and presumably mediation, might be resumed. In 1960, a federal statute
ordered railway strikers to return to work, and postponed the resumption of the
strike for a period of six months.9 5 While no formal settlement mechanism was
created and the parties succeeded in reaching an agreement during this period,
it is obvious that the threat of an imposed solution must have been in the minds
of the negotiators. Similarly, a Newfoundland statute90 in 1967 peremptorily
ended a strike of hospital workers, but created no mechanism for the resolution
of the dispute beyond an informal promise of arbitration should negotiation
prove fruitless. A 1967 Quebec statute97 was much more elaborate. It ended a
prolonged teacher's strike, revived a number of collective agreements which had
expired, extended their duration for approximately one year, and specified
wage increases to be paid by the school board-employers. Also specific provision
was made for province-wide negotiation of the next, and all succeeding, collective
agreements, in aid of which a special fact-finding body was to be established.
The coercive power of the state, merely hinted at in the passage of the 1960
federal railway legislation, is unmistakeably announced in the Quebec statute.
Future wage disputes may be submitted to binding arbitration by either party
or by the Ministry of Labour.
The Quebec statute represents the convergence of two techniques by which
peace-keeping has been translated from an exercise in persuasion into a commit-
ment to compulsion. It illustrates both the direct control by the government
over the conduct of one party to a public interest dispute, and the creation of
an obligation to resort to a specified method of dispute settlement other than
the strike.
92. Trade Union Act, N.S. Rev. Stat. c. 295, § 68(2) (1954), as amended, [19651 N.S.
Stat. c. 53.
93. Industrial Relations Act, [1962] P.E.I. Stat. c. 18, § 42, as amended, [1966) P.E.I.
Stat. c. 19.
94. Lab. Code, [1964] Que. Rev. Stat. c. 141, § 99 (1964), as amended, [1965] Que.
Stat c. 50.
95. Railway Operation Continuation Act, [1960-61] Can. Stat. c. 2 (1960).
96. Hospital Employees (Employment) Act, [1966-67] Newf. Stat. c. 11 (1966).
97. An Act to Insure to Children the Right to Education and to Institute a New
Schooling Collective Agreement Plan, [1965] Que. Stat. bill 25.
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The technique of seizure, familiar in a variety of American state statutes,98
has seldom been employed in Canada. Strictly speaking, of course, the Quebec
school legislation did not remove control of the schools from local boards of
education, but in fact they were required to grant the increases provided in the
statute, and their autonomy as negotiating bodies was clearly ended. Henceforth,
the provincial government can be expected to exercise a decisive influence in
teacher negotiations. More clearly analogous to seizure in the familiar American
sense were two other Quebec situations. In one, a government trustee was ap-
pointed to administer almost half of the province's hospitals, in order to end
a three week strike; 99 a settlement was negotiated and the hospitals were then
returned to local management. In the other, an administrator was appointed,
under an amendment to the Transportation Board Act, 10 to assume control of
a private ferry company and to settle a strike which had interrupted service.
The only other instance in which seizure was employed was during a strike of
seamen serving on a coastal ferry in British Columbia. Special federal legisla-
tionlol was passed providing an interim wage settlement and vesting control of
the ferry line in a government-designated administrator who was empowered to
operate it and to negotiate a settlement. The statute also provided for the
resumption of collective bargaining and needlessly, as matters turned out, for
compulsory arbitration.
If seizure of the enterprise is a technique familiar to American students of
the public interest dispute, two Canadian statutes must be virtually unique in
the annals of North American labor legislation. In both of these statutes, the
government in effect "seized" the union rather than the employer. Newfoundland,
in 1959, passed ad hoc legislation 02 which dissolved two union locals in order
to halt a bitter woods strike. Only in Newfoundland could a strike of loggers
conceivably be termed an "emergency," but in terms of local political realities
there can be no doubt that the domestic tranquility of the island province was
shattered. The legislation was greeted with derision in the rest of the country,
but it escaped constitutional challenge, served its purpose, and was in due
course partially repealed.10 3 Of greater significance was the 1963 federal legisla-
tion'04 imposing trusteeship on five unions representing seamen on the Great
Lakes. The statute was designed to end the disruption of shipping which had
been produced by inter-union rivalry, rooted in the labor movement's desire to
"free" seamen from the allegedly corrupt Seafarers' International Union. This
98. Northrup & Rowan, State Seizure in Public Interest Disputes, in H. Northrup,
Compulsory Arbitration and Government Intervention in Labour Disputes app. B (1966).
99. Hospitals Act, Que. Rev. Stat. c. 164, § 17 (1964).
100. Transportation Board Act, Que. Rev. Stat. c. 228 (1964), as amended, [1965]
Que. Stat. bill 1.
101. British Columbia Coast Steamship Service Act, [1958] Can. Stat. c. 7.
102. Trade Union (Emergency Provisions) Act, [1959] Newf. Stat. c. 21; Labour
Relations Act, Newf. Rev. Stat. c. 258 (1952), as amended, [1959] Newf. Stat. c. 1.
103. Labour Relations Act, Newf. Rev. Stat. c. 258 (1952), as amended, [1960]
Newf. Stat. c. 58, and [1963] Newf. Stat. c. 82.
104. Maritime Transportation Unions Trustees Act, [19631 Can. Stat. c. 17.
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disruption was the subject of an extensive inquiry,105 fierce public debate, and
behind-the-scenes negotiation in government and union circles. When all else
failed, a board of three trustees assumed management of all unions operating on
the Great Lakes, and principally the Seafarers'. After some four years of opera-
tion, the trustees seem to be about to relinquish control to presumably reformed,
and duly elected, union officers.
It is a telling comment on the state of civil liberties in Canada that virtually
no legal basis existed for challenging either statute on the grounds of interfer-
ence with freedom of association.10 6 However, viewed purely as an exercise in
the expedient settlement of public interest disputes, "seizure" of the union can
hardly be surpassed.
Turning next to the conventional methods of substituting some technique
of dispute settlement for the strike as the terminal point in collective bargaining,
there have been a few Canadian legislative experiments with "mediation to a
finality"-to use a term popularized by the U.S. Secretary of Labor, W. Willard
Wirtz. An early version of the Prince Edward Island legislation gave the Public
Utilities Commission power to review the recommendations of a conciliation
board report in any dispute involving a utility and to impose its recommenda-
tions upon the parties with or without change,' 0 7 and in Manitoba, the Cabinet
has the power to confirm or vary, and make binding, the award of a mediator in
disputes affecting public utilities, the liquor commission, and provincial govern-
ment employees.' 08 Binding mediation is likewise provided in British Columbia
to resolve collective bargaining impasses involving employees of the public hydro-
electric system"09 and of municipal police and fire departments. 1"0 Obviously, in
each case "finality" is secured by a prohibition against strikes. Actual experience
under these statutes has been negligible, and no published accounts exist of their
use.
Choice-of-procedures legislation, widely advocated in the United States,"'
is represented on the Canadian statute books by one bizarre, but apparently
moribund, enactment. An Alberta statute provides that "where at any time in
the opinion of [the cabinet] a state of emergency exists ... in such circum-
105. T. G. Norris, Report of the Industrial Inquiry Commission on the Disruption of
Shipping (Can. 1963).
106. The constitutionality of the Maritime Transportation Unions Trustees Act was
upheld in Swait v. Trustees of the Maritime Transp. Unions, [1967] Que. B.R. 315, 61
D.L.R.2d 317 (1966). But see D. Schmeiser, Civil Liberties in Canada 222 (1964).
107. Trade Union Act, P.E.I. Rev. Stat. c. 164, § 23 (1951), as amended, [1953-54]
P.E.I. Stat. c. 3 (1953), repealed by Industrial Relations Act, [1962) P.E.I. Stat. c. 18, § 58.
108. Civil Service Act, Man. Rev. Stat. c. 39 (1954), as amended, [1965] Man. Stat.
c. 11.
109. British Columbia Hydro & Power Authority Act, [19641 B.C. Stat. c. 7, § 56.
110. Municipal Act, B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 255, § 194 (1960).
111. See S. Slichter, The Challenge of Industrial Relations ch. vi (1947) ; Wirtz, The
"Choice-of-Procedures" Approach to National Emergency Disputes, in Emergency Disputes
and National Policy (I. Bernstein, H. Enarson & R. Fleming eds. 1955); Cox, The Uses and
Abuses of Union Power, 35 Notre Dame Law. 624 (1960); Horlacher, A Political Scicnce
View of National Emergency Disputes, 333 Annals 85 (1961) ; see also Comm. for Econ.
Development, The Public Interest in National Labour Policy 94 (1961).
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stances that life or property would be in serious jeopardy" by reason of a labor
dispute affecting hospital or public utility employees, a proclamation may be
issued which renders further strike action illegal, and authorizes the Minister of
Labour to "forthwith establish a procedure to assist the parties to the dis-
pute."112 The breathtaking open-endedness of the statute may well have been
a deterrent to its use, as the timing and method of intervention is left com-
pletely in the hands of the executive, and subjected to neither legislative pre-
scription nor judicial review.
By far the most common substitute for the strike is arbitration. Parties
to any collective bargaining relationship may, of course, voluntarily submit
their negotiating disputes to third-party adjudication, but seldom do so.
113 The
two prominent exceptions to this aversion to arbitration are unions of policemen
and firefighters whose constitutions frequently contain a no-strike pledge. Their
self-denying ordinances are recognized in several provincial statutes 14 which
provide for binding arbitration only for those unions which are committed to a
policy of settling disputes without stoppage of work.
Usually, however, provincial statutes provide for compulsory arbitration
for police and fire department employees, 1 5 and with increasing frequency for
hospital'" and public utilities workers"17 and teachers. 118 As has been recounted,
federal ad hoc legislation has twice compelled the arbitration of railway dis-
putes,"') and the probabilities are great that future bargaining impasses on the
railways, and perhaps the airlines, will be similarly resolved.
Of the provincial statutes, the most sophisticated is the Ontario Hospital
Labour Disputes Arbitration Act, 20 which was passed following a Royal Com-
112. The Alberta Labour Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 167, §§ 99(1), (3) (1955), as amended,
[1960] Alta. Stat. c. 54.
113. A rare instance of this involved a newspaper bargaining unit. See Matter of the
Ottawa Citizen, [1966] Ont. L.R.B. Mthly. Rep. 535 (Oct.).
114. City Act, Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 147, § 104 (1963); Fire Departments Platoon Act,
Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 173, § 10 (1965); Fire Departments Arbitration Act, [1954] Man. Stat.
c. 8, § 6.
115. Fire Departments Platoon Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 114, § 14 (1955); The Police
Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 236, §§ 24-30 (1955), as amended, [1955-56] Alta. Stat. c. 41; Fire
Departments Arbitration Act, [1954] Man. Stat. c. 8, § 6; The Police Act, Ont. Rev. Stat.
c. 298, §§ 26-35 (1960) ; Fire Departments Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 145, § 6 (1960) ; Industrial
Relations Act, [1962] P.E.I. Stat. c. 18, § 44, as amended, [1966] P.E.I. Stat. c. 19; Lab2
Code, Que. Rev. Stat. c. 141, § 82 (1964) ; City Act, Sask Rev. Stat. c. 147, § 104 (1965);
The Fire Departments Platoon Act, Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 173, § 10 (1965).
116. Hospital Labour Disputes Act, [1965] Ont. Stat. c. 48, §§ 5-7; Industrial Relations
Arbitration Act, [1962] P.E.I. Stat. c. 18, § 44, as amended, [1966] P.E.I. Stat. c. 19; Essen-
tial Services Emergency Act, [1966] Sask. Stat. c. 2, § 4.
117. Toronto Hydro-Employees' Union Dispute Act, [1965] Ont. Stat. c. 131, §§ 3, 4;
Ontario Hydro-Employees' Union Dispute Act, [1961-62] Ont. Stat. c. 94, §§ 2, 3 (1962);
Essential Services Emergency Act, [1966] Sask. Stat. c. 2, § 4.
118. Public Schools Act, B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 319, § 140 (1960), as amended, [1965]
B.C. Stat. c. 41; Public Schools Act, Man. Rev. Stat. c. 215, § 379(b) (1954), as amended,
[1956] Man. Stat. c. 53; An Act to Insure to Children the Right to Education and to
Institute a New Schooling Collective Agreement Plan, [1967] Que. Stat. bill 25.
119. Maintenance of Railway Operation Act, [1950-51] Can. Stat. c. 1, § 5 (1950);
Maintenance of Railway Operation Act, [1966-67] Can. Stat. bill C-230, §§ 9, 10 (1966).
120. [1965] Ont. Stat. c. 48.
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mission inquiry.121 During the public hearings held by the Royal Commission,
a wide diversity of opinion was revealed on the desirability of compulsory arbi-
tration in hospital labor disputes, with a majority of labor spokesmen opposing
arbitration, and a majority of management spokesmen in favor.12 2 However,
important exceptions on each side precluded any stigmatization of the statute
as management-inspired. The major recommendation was modest enough: the
cabinet was to be given power to send a dispute to arbitration only if in its
judgment "patient care is adversely affected or seriously threatened," or if
either party bad been judicially found to be bargaining in bad faith. 1 23
However, the statute as enacted went much further. While hospital em-
ployees were in all other respects made subject to the Labour Relations Act,1 2 4
upon the breakdown of negotiations and the exhaustion of compulsory concilia-
tion procedures, arbitration is automatically set in motion,125 and all strikes are
prohibited.126 Since the Act came into force in April, 1965, approximately
twenty cases have gone to arbitration, while some one hundred fifty agreements
have been consummated in direct negotiations or with the aid of a conciliator,
a pattern which to some extent refutes the claim that the easy availability of
arbitration will stultify bargaining.
In terms of institutional arrangements, arbitration is to be conducted by
tripartite ad hoc boards with the broadest possible mandate to gather evidence
and to receive submissions on the matters in controversy, subject only to due
process considerations. 127 The award of the board is to be incorporated in a
binding collective agreement which the board is empowered to formulate should
the parties be unable to do so.128 The real gaps in the legislation, however, are
the failure to provide the board either with criteria for judgment or a reliable
source of statistical data beyond that which the parties adduce or the board
can gather by its own initiative.
1 29
It is in relation to these two matters that the new federal Public Service
Staff Relations Act 30 can be considered model legislation. Upon certification,
a bargaining agent representing public employees is obliged to elect between
arbitration and strike as the method it proposes to pursue for the resolution of
negotiation disputes with the government.131 Subject only to the union's right to
121. C. E. Bennett, Report of Royal Commission on Compulsory Arbitration in
Disputes Affecting Hospitals and Their Employees (Ont. 1964).
122. Id. 26.
123. Id. 50 passim.
124. Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act, [1965] Ont. Stat. c. 48, § 2(2).
125. Id. § 4.
126. Id. § 8.
127. Id. § 5.
128. Id. § 7.
129. See Matter of Welland County General Hospital, 16 Lab. Arb. Cas. 1 (1965);
Matter of St. Joseph's Hospital, 16 Lab. Arb. Cas. 353 (1965).
130. [19671 Can. Stat. c. 72.
131. Id. §§ 36, q9.
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re-elect, 32 and to the designation of non-striking "essential" employees,
1 33 it is
this voluntary surrender of the right to strike which creates the binding obliga-
tion to arbitrate. But if resort to arbitration is a matter of free choice, it has
been made an attractive one. Instead of entrusting arbitration to a series of
ad hoc boards, a permanent independent tripartite Arbitration Tribunal was
established. Its permanence was viewed as some assurance that "it would be
able in time to gain a deep understanding of the Public Service," to develop
"some measure of continuity in the standards ... on which arbitral awards are
based," and to gain "the respect and confidence upon which the success of the
whole system will ultimately depend."' 34 Moreover, instead of simply instructing
the arbitrators to "examine into and decide on matters that are in dispute," as
does the Ontario hospital statute,1 35 the federal act carefully specified the
criteria for decision-making. 136 Equally important, an independent paid research
bureau has been established under the administrative aegis of the Public
Service Staff Relations Board to provide accurate statistical data both to the
parties and to the Arbitration Tribunal, which should greatly enhance the
quality of both argument and decision-making.
III. CONCLUSION
Why has Canadian legislation on public interest dispute settlement taken
so many forms, been so often amended, and so greatly expanded in recent years?
In part, the diversity of legislation reflects a diversity of political philoso-
phies and socio-economic environments throughout the country. For example, the
pioneering public employment statute 37 was passed in 1944 in Saskatchewan by
the first C.C.F. (socialist) government, which was ideologically committed to the
extension of collective bargaining. The sweeping Alberta legislation
33 was
enacted by a right-wing Social Credit government. The Quebec situation can
132. Id. §§ 37(2), 38.
133. See supra p. 47.
134. Report of the Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargaining in the Public
Service 35 (Can. 1965).
135. Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act, [1965] Ont. Stat. c 48, § 6(1).
136. See [1967] Can. Stat. c. 72, § 68 which provides:
In the conduct of proceedings before it and in rendering an arbitral award in respect
of a matter in dispute the Arbitration Tribunal shall consider
(a) the needs of the Public Service for qualified employees;
(b) the conditions of employment in similar occupations outside the Public
Service, including such geographical, industrial or other variations as the
Arbitration Tribunal may consider relevant;
(c) the need to maintain appropriate relationships in the conditions of employ-
ment as between different grade levels within an occupation and as be-
tween occupations in the Public Service;
(d) the need to establish terms and conditions of employment that are fair
and reasonable in relation to the qualifications required, the work per-
formed, the responsibility assumed and the nature of the services rendered;
and
(e) any other factor that to it appears to be relevant to the matter in dispute.
137. See authorities collected in supra note 29.
138. Alberta Labour Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 167, § 99 (1955), as amended, [1960]
Alta. Stat. c. 54.
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only be understood against the background of French Canada's new self-
assertiveness.
In part, the legislation reflects the evolution of trade union militancy, and
of public attitudes towards the strike. On the one hand, formerly somnolent
groups such as teachers, public employees, and to some extent hospital workers,
have begun to demand, to receive, and to exercise the right to bargain collectively
which other groups have enjoyed for a generation. Lacking experience and with
a backlog of ungratified expectations, these groups may be particularly strike-
prone. On the other hand, groups, such as railway employees, which have tradi-
tionally enjoyed and exercised the right to strike are now encountering public
intolerance of any disruption of service. Always immanent when inconvenience
and economic loss is thrust on the public during a labor dispute, this intolerance
may be intensified by a growing conviction, in many fields of economic activity,
that the public interest is to be preferred over private freedom of action. If
there is a widespread demand for regulation of insurance rates and interest
rates, of grocery prices and packaging, is it surprising that the wage bargain
and the processes by which it is struck should likewise engage public concern?
If utilities and railways are to be forbidden to discontinue service where the
public convenience is threatened, should not their employees be subject to similar
constraints? Implicit in this line of argument, of course, is the growing conviction
that the labor movement no longer needs, or deserves, the freedom of action it
enjoyed when its very existence was at stakr.
In part, finally, the legislation has often been sired by crisis, and thereafter
it bears the bar sinister of "strike-breaking," if it does not die at birth from the
sheer ineptitude of its draftsmen. Two prominent exceptions to this syndrome
are the Ontario hospitals statute,139 and the federal Public Service Staff Rela-
tions Act,140 both of which were the product of intensive investigation and study,
and both of which seem likely to perform usefully in the years to come.
Beyond these considerations, however, an iron law of public interest disputes
seems to hold all such legislation within its grip. As two American commentators
have stated:
If the parties are not faced with the consequences of refusing to settle,
their desire, determination or even ability to settle dwindles. This has
occurred under each and every law or procedure, federal and state,
legal and extralegal, which has been in existence. No strike control
law or extralegal method has succeeded in avoiding this pitfall. ...
Emergency disputes thus create their own rationale. Behaviour be-
comes tailored to the laws. The more laws enacted, the more "emer-
gencies" are created, and the more "necessary" become the laws.'
41
Canadian legislative experience largely seems to confirm this unhappy
generalization.
139. Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act, (1965] Ont. Stat. c. 48, § 2(2).
140. See [1967] Can. Stat. c. 79.
141. H. Northrup & G. Bloom, Government and Labour 420-21 (1963).
